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ABSTRACT
Memory acquisition is essential to defeat anti-forensic operating-system features and investigate
cyberattacks that leave little or no evidence in secondary storage. The forensic community has
developed tools to acquire physical memory from Apple's Macintosh computers, but they have not
much been tested. This work tested three major OS X memory-acquisition tools. Although the
tools could capture system memory accurately, the open-source tool OSXPmem appeared
advantageous in size, reliability, and support for memory configurations and versions of the OS X
operating system.
Keywords: digital forensics; acquisition; main memory; Macintosh; OSX; testing

l. INTRODUCTION
As Recent Macintosh OS X operating systems
incorporate many anti-forensic features, most
notably in cloud storage and encryption. Users
can fully encrypt many things, including entire
volumes of the secondary storage, making it
impossible to recover forensic evidence from
storage in a reasonable period of time without
passwords. Because of this, forensics on the
main memory of such systems is increasingly
valuable. Memory forensics can recover
running
processes,
network
packets,
communications artifacts, encryption keys, and
injected code from volatile memory. It is
helpful to compare available tools for memory
forensics.

2. PREVIOUS WORK
Memory acquisition is a challenge for digital
forensics because memory is volatile, and a tool
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must interact gracefully with an operating
system, as noted in Sutherland et al. (2008).
Errors can occur with any memory acquisition
because memory changes unpredictably over
time, as discussed in Pan et al. (2008), but
tools can do several things to minimize errors.
While there are a number of memoryacquisition tools and analysis programs for
Windows operating systems (see Neethu et al.,
2014) and Android devices (see Li et al. , 2016) ,
there are only a few for Macintosh systems (see
Ligh et al., 2014). Macintosh machines
generally impose stiffer access controls than
Windows machines, but they are more
aggressive in caching, which permits recovering
some main memory even when the machine
has been turned off, as noted by BlackBag
Technologies (2017).
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Most research on memory acquisition has
focused on developing new techniques, with
only a few projects testing tools. Carvajal et al.
(2013) compared six Windows tools in their
ability to extract memory quickly without
leaving artifacts. Kamal et al. (2016) also
tested six Windows tools (two different from
the previous work) and focused on the artifacts
left by the tools. Ahmed and Aslam (2015)
compared six Windows tools (four different
from Carvajal et al) and found a few
differences in performance between them,
especially when anti-forensics measures were
taken on the target machines.
The
abovementioned
tools
provide
software-based acquisition, in contrast to tools
such as Inception and Passware's Firewire
Memory Imager that are hardware-supported.
Hardware support can circumvent password
protection, but there must be different tool
versions for different hardware and they can be
limited in how much memory they can acquire.
Modern software-based tools generally require
a kernel to be installed on the target system,
must deal with memory compression, and must
be careful to avoid interfering with reserved
areas of memory as discussed in Libser and
Kornblum (2008) . Memory-acquisition tools
can be distinguished from memory-analysis
tools such as the open-source Volatility (2015)
and Rekall (2015) that allow inspection of
specific artifacts, and analysis tools require
detailed knowledge of where an operating
system keeps things, so they require frequent
updates.
For Macintosh machines, software-based
acquisition tools available are MacQuisition
(www.blackbagtech.com/ softwareproducts / macquisi tion. html),
Google / Rekall
OSXPMem
(releases. rekall-forensic. com),
Sumuri
Forensics
RECON
(sumueri.com/ software/ recon), Mandiant Mac
Memoryze
(www.fireeye.com/
and
services/ freeware / memoryze. html) ,
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Volafox
(code.google.com/ p/ volafox).
and
VMWARE
Fusion
Volatility
(www.vmware.com/ products/ fusion.html) after
version 10. 7 also provide some Macintosh
memory-forensic capabilities.

3. lVlETHODOLOGY
This work tested the three Macintosh memoryacquisition tools: MacQuisition version 2014Rl ,
OSXPMem version RC3 , and Sumuri Forensics
RECON version 1.0.11. We evaluated the tools
on (1) ability to write a physical-memory
capture without crashing the target computer
system, (2) obtrusiveness (what its memory
footprint was and how long it took to run) ,
and (3) ability to produce a capture from
which standard forensic artifacts could be
recovered using the Volatility Framework and
the Rekall Memory Forensic Framework. The
Rekall plugins used were arp ( ARP tables) ,
ifconfig (network interface), lsof (open files),
mount (mount points), netstat (network
connections) , psaux (processes), and route
(routing tables). The Volatility plugins used
were mac _ arp, mac _ bash (Bash shell history) ,
mac-ifconfig,
mac lsof,
mac-mount ,
mac netstat, mac _ psaux, and mac route. We
were particularly interested in comparing
memory snapshots of tools in similar states
since they could indicate functional differences
or coverage gaps.
This work first tested the OSX Mavericks
(10 .9.5) operating system, and then retested
after upgrading to Yosemite 10.10.1 and
10.10.2 (more details are given in Leopard,
2015). Each tool was directed to write a
memory capture to an external USB 3 hard
drive of 7200RPM. In total, 450 captures were
performed: 50 machines, 3 operating systems,
and 3 forensic tools.
We did five kinds of experiments: (1)
testing the tools' ability to recover memory,
(2) testing the localizing of encryption keys,
(3) observing memory changes over time, (4)
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comparing outputs between tools, and (5)
comparing with output for a non-virtual
environment. In all these experiments, we ran
the operating systems with no additional
modifications, software, or tasks.
The rate at which memory changes affects
the memory dumps acquired by tools. To
analyze the systems more accurately, as well
obtain flexibility in the setup, we created a
virtual machine as in Zhang et al. (2010). We
used VMware Fusion Professional version 7 .1.1
and took a series of snapshots. The virtual
machine ran the Mavericks operating system
and was configured to use two processor cores
and 8 GiB of memory. The host machine was a
MacBook Pro (Retina, 15-inch, 2014) with a
2.8 GHz Intel i7 processor and 16 GiB of 1600
MHz DDR3 memory. Our specific procedure
was: (1) log into the virtual machine and take
a snapshot every minute for the first fifteen
minutes, and then at 20, 25 , and 30 minutes;
(2) use the Volatility plugin to decompress the
snapshots; (3) create MD5 hashes for every 4
KiB block; and (4) compare the MD5 hashes
with the original hashes and note differences.
We compared memory captured by each of our
tools against the virtual machine snapshot that
completed at a time closest to when each
capture completed. We then compared the
memory captures taken with the tools.
Memory acquisition can be assessed in
terms in its correctness (whether it captures
what is stored in memory at some time), its
atomicity (whether it shows concurrent
activity), and its integrity (its persistence in
correctness for some guaranteed time period),
as suggested in Vomel and Freiling (2012). The
current work addressed correctness and (in a
simple way) integrity, but not atomicity since
analyzing that requires more precise tools.
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4.RESULTS
4 .1

Ability to Recover Merr1.ocy

All three tools successfully acquired memory.
Acquisition speeds were within 7% for the
three. Physical memory sizes were 67.45 MiB
for MacQuisition, 0.944 MiB for OSXPmem,
and 206.7 MiB for RECON. Shared memory
and private memory sizes were proportional.
OSXPmem had a size advantage as a
command-line tool without a graphical user
interface.
We observed several crashes caused by
tools.
Valuable forensic data can be
permanently lost in a crash, so crash danger is
important. No machine crashed more than
once, and after a crash, a second acquisition
attempt was often successful after the
machines restarted, with one exception. The
exception was when RECON was used to
acquire memory from the Mac Pros with 64
GiB of RAM; all the machines crashed, and
additional attempts also failed. Nonetheless,
examination of the results confirmed that if a
memory capture was completed without a
crash, the capture contained all forensic
artifacts found by the other tools.

4. 2

I..ocalizing Encryption Keys

The Passware Password Recovery Kit Forensic
Version 13.1 was used to confirm that
encryption keys for FileVault2 were located
within the OS X memory captures and could
be used to decrypt the volume. To do this,
FileVault2 was enabled on a MacBook Pro and
a Mac Pro computer running Mavericks as well
as on a MacBook Pro and a Mac Pro computer
running Yosemite. Memory captures were done
with MacQuisition, OSXPMem, and RECON
on both the MacBook Pro and Mac Pro
computers running Mavericks. RECON failed
to capture physical memory from the Mac Pro
computers. OSXPMem was used to capture
memory from the Mac Pro and MacBook Pro
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running Yosemite. MacQuisition
support Yosemite at the time.

did

not

4 .3

Observing Memory Changes
overThne

Passware located the encryption keys in all
of the memory captures and successfully
decrypted the FileVault2 volumes. The OS X
user's login password was located within all
the memory captures using the hex editor
iBored by searching for the term "longname"
which we found frequently near a user's
password. The password remained in the same
block of memory during the thirty-minute
period on all captures.

Memory captures (snapshots) were taken over
a period on a virtual machine with Mac OS
version Mavericks installed. A Python script
counted the 4 KiB blocks whose hash values
changed from the original snapshot. Typically,
the virtual machine used 1.35 GiB of memory
ran 110-120 processes during tests. Results
showed that on average only 5.33% of the
blocks had changed after 30 minutes when
running only default processes, and not
smoothly (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Average block hash match percentage over time on OSX Mavericks.

Memory captures were larger than the
allocated physical memory due to the presence
of reserved areas. The datasheet for Fourth
Generation Intel Core Processor Address Map
describes reserved areas below 4GiB that do
not belong to the dynamic random-access
memory (see Intel, 2012). Because of this,
when the vmem files containing the memory in
the virtual-machine snapshots were converted
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to raw images, each vmem file was 9 GiB in
size, though the virtual-machine configuration
allocated 8 GiB to physical memory. Stuttgen
and Cohen (2015) discuss how physical
memory addresses are used for communication
with devices (video cards, PCI cards, and flash
memory) on the motherboard with memorymapped I/ O. The 1 GiB block ranges observed
between 3 GiB and 4 GiB appear to be
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reserved for this, and the chipset routes
memory access around these reserved regions.

4.4

Comparing Tools

All three tools captured the same range of null
values in the first half of the memory graphs.
The MacQuisition device log did report "bad
addresses" were padded with zeroes beginning
at block 786432 and ending at block 1048575.
Each block contained 4096 bytes resulting in
approximately 1 GiB of null characters. We
inspected the block range in all three tool
memory captures with a hex editor and
confirmed that all the tools padded the same
block range with zeroes.
Figure 2 shows example 4-KiB block
matches between the tool-acquired memory
captures of the virtual machine and the
virtual-machine snapshot SVl taken 1 minute
after start. Figure 3 shows matches among the
tool images themselves at the same times. The
vertical axis represents slices of 4MiB, so each
diagram shows around 9GiB of memory. The
three plots in both Figures show MacQuisition,
OSXPmem, and RECON in order. The darker
areas represent matches to the initial memory
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state without null (zero) characters; grey
blocks represent blocks that match but contain
null characters; and the white blocks represent
blocks that have changed and do not match.
The top of the diagram represents the
beginning of memory. The waviness of the
boundaries is intended to make them easier to
see and does not indicate uncertainty.
Overall, we saw similar regions of non-null
matches (the white areas) in all comparisons.
However, the tool memory captures showed
that most of the null characters observed in
the virtual-machine snapshots were overwritten
with data when the acquisition tools
themselves acquired the memory. This would
suggest as the memory-capture tools run,
blocks of memory containing null characters
get changed while other blocks remain mostly
unchanged. Since these regions are large and
outside the memory space used by the tools, it
is unlikely that the tools themselves are
changing the data directly. Rather, we
conclude that some other mechanism of the
operating system is writing to unused space in
memory during the acquisition process.
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Figure 2. Virtual Machine Comparisons of MacQuisition
(Upper Left) , OSXPmem (Upper Right) , and RECON (Lower
Left) to the Snapshot after 1 Minute on Each Machine
(Vertical Axis Measures 4MiB Slices)
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Figure 3. Comparison of the Three Tools on Analogous States
of a Virtual Machine

Figure 3 also shows that each tool is
capturing the same matched blocks and the
same reserved region as the virtual-machine
snapshot . But the tools differ in how they
capture blocks of memory that do not match
the blocks from snapshot. This suggests not
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only that the tools are introducing change to
the memory space during the acquisition
process, but also that each is changing the
space in a unique way, so the changes from
different tools do not match each other.
Nonetheless,
we saw no evidence of
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randomizing of memory locations on reboots,
as described in Gu and Lin (2016), at this level
of granularity.

4 .5

Comparing to a Non-Virtual
Environment

To control for possible effects due solely to
VMware's environment, we tested the tools in
a non-virtual environment of a physical Mac
Mini (late 2014) with a 2.6 GHz Intel i7
processor, 8 GiB of 1600 MHz DDR3 memory,
and running Mavericks. Each tool acquired a
9.74 GiB raw file (Figure 4). There were
nonmatching blocks in the first 2GiB of the
memory that had not been observed before,
but they were not clustered, causing the gray
shading. All tools captured the same range of
null values 2GiB to 4GiB with some small
differences in the claimed boundaries, and
overall this reserved area appeared to be larger
than in the virtual-machine memory images.
Analysis with a hex editor determined that the
reserved region began at 2.17 GiB and
continued until 4 GiB. It is clear there are
more changes to memory on a real machine.

around 30% of the total captured material, but
remained relatively stable, declining by less
than 10% over a 30-minute period (Figure 5).
The match percent was less than what was
observed in the virtual environment as Figure
3 also suggests.

5. CONCLUSION
MacQuisition, RECON, and OSXPmem were
all successful in capturing memory from OSX
on Macintosh computers. However, OSXPmem
bettered its proprietary counterparts in its size,
reliability,
and
support
for
memory
configurations and versions of the OSX
operating system. Volatility and Rekall could
use the memory captures from all three tools
to obtain artifacts such as FileVault2
encryption keys. Nonetheless, we observed
crashes. Ligh et al. (2015) acknowledges that
all memory-acquisition tools can cause system
crashes since the tool may access a reserved
region at the wrong time or interfere with a
system-critical function. Interference may be
hard to anticipate because of variations
between OSX versions and installed hardware.

Data also showed that the block matches
containing non-null characters were initially
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Our results showed that size of the memory
capture was constant over the tools. Memory
dumps were larger than the amount of physical
memory (17.99 GiB versus 16 GiB for
MacBook Pro was typical) due to reserved
regions.
of
the
virtual-machine
Comparison
snapshots taken over thirty minutes showed
that with running only the default processes,
memory did not change much. Though
significant regions of memory did not match
between the tool-acquired dumps and the
virtual-machine snapshots, these regions
contained nulls in the baseline snapshot.
Because of this, our analysis of forensic
artifacts using Volatility and Rekall failed to
detect any situations in which the nonmatching regions corresponded to a loss of
forensic evidence.
The experiments with a non-virtual
environment showed the memory captures
from all three tools appeared similar in the
blocks that matched but did not match as well
for the blocks containing null characters. The
results also agree with the results of our tests
in the virtual environment in that the regions
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of memory that match between comparisons
did not change much over time.
Future work will examine in more detail
the exact changes in files over time and the
discrepancies
between
different
tools.
Discrepancies suggest, without having to
analyze the operating system, where volatile
memory
stores
key
operating-system
parameters and links. Future work will also
investigate the effects of simultaneously
running additional software on the operatingsystem memory images.
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